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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
V-I OIL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Respondent, 
ANCHOR PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, 
Petitioner. 
Case No. 8878 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON 
INTERMEDIATE APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We accept petitioner's statement of 'the case 
and facts with the following: 
For several years the plaintiff had been en-
gaged in the business of selling gasoline and other 
petroleun1 products, both wholesale and retail. This 
did not include L.P. gas. The date the contract was 
entered into, plaintiff did not have a sales organ-
ization for handling this product, and neither did 
it have any customers. Both i'ts sales organization 
and its market had to be developed. This was fully 
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·known to the defendant (Dep. 30-31). In fact, the 
defendant has agreed to and was assisting plain-
tiff to find a manager to handle 'this phase of its 
business (Dep. 31-35). 
The contract (R 3-5) was forwarded unsigned 
to the plaintiff for its signing, provided it met with 
its approval (Exhibit 2). Prior to plaintiff's sign-
ing it, however, plaintiff's manager talked with de-
fendant by telephone, explaining it could not meet 
the minimum requirements, because of not having 
any customers and a sales organization, and he was 
advised that this was of no importance and that i't 
would furnish him with the rna terial he needed 
(Dep 10-11). Following this conversation, the plain-
tiff signed the contract, returning i't on September 
6, 1954 to defendant at Long Beach, California, 
with a letter which stated: 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed find contract executed which 
you forwarded September 1, 1954. 
It appears that we are going to be a little 
slow in starting, but I am sure we will use 
the total commitment in the next year. 
'The defendant signed and returned the contra~t 
to the plaintiff, who received it on September 10, 
(Dep. 9). A third of the month of September had 
passed. The plain tiff purchased no products in Sep-
tember. However, in October, it purchased 11,995 
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gallons. In November, prior to defendants letter of 
cancellation, it purchased 6,546 gallons. After the 
delivery of the cancellation notice, plaintiff pur-
chased and defendant delivered 13,053 gallons, or a 
total of 19,599 gallons in the month of November. 
(R. 20-21). 
The aforementioned deliveries of L.P. gas were 
made without protest or objection. The only objec-
tion raised by defendant was to plaintiff's sales 
practice in reducing the retail price to its customers. 
To this, defendant bitterly objected, because of the 
protest of plaintiff's competitors (Dep. 13-15 & 27, 
36-40). 
After the contract was returned by defendant 
to plaintiff, defendant on more than one occasion 
advised plaintiff that the gallonage figures were of 
no significance and 'that it would always supply him 
with ·what products he needed (Dep. 10-11). 
On December 3, 1954, the plaintiff (by regis-
tered mail) advised the defendant that it did not 
agree with the cancellation of the contract and that 
it expected the defendant to continue to furnish 
it with the products covered by the agreement (Ex-
hibit 6). This the defendant refused to do (Dep. 
36-40). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL WAS 
A 'COUN'TER OFFER WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY 
THE DEFENDANT. 
We agree with defendant that a conditional 
acceptance, one that imposes new terms or condi-
tions is a rejection of the original offer, and consti-
tutes a countr offer, which must be accepted. 
'The contract was transmitted to the plaintiff 
unsigned, by letter, for its consideration (Exhibit 
2). The plaintiff, in view of it not having a L.P. 
gas sales organization, nor a present market for the 
product, recognized that it could not meet the month-
ly minimum requirement of 20,000 gallons per, 
month, and so qualified its acceptance, after a tele-
phone conversation, by its letter of transmittal (R. 
6, Exhibit 3) , stating: 
"It appears that we are going to be a 
little slow in starting, but I am sure we will 
use the total commitment in the next year." 
This was a rejection of the defendants offer, 
as it introduced a new condition, that is- it elimin-
ated the minimum requirement of 20,000 gallons 
per month with the provision, however, that it would 
purchase 240,000 gallons during the year. This was 
assented to by the defendant when it signed and 
returned the contract to the plaintiff without ob-
jection. 
:l 
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It should be noted that the contract was signed 
at Idaho Falls, Idaho by the plaintiff, sent to the 
defendant at Long Beach, California on September 
6th and returned signed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, who received it on September 10. The 
contract was effective retroactive as of September 
1 - the month was 'then one-third over. 
We agree with the authorities cited by the peti-
tioner under its Point I, pages 7-9, as 'to the law 
pertaining to the offers and counter offers, and we 
refer the court thereto. 
In addition to the authorities cited by the peti-
tioner, vve call the court's attention to the case of 
American Lumber & Mfg. Co. vs. Atlantic Mill & 
Lumber Co. ( 290 Fed. 632, 635), which says: 
"Where one makes an offer and assents 
'to an acception which is not responsive to the 
proposal, a con tract is made and he is, of 
course, bound by it'' 
An expressed assent to new terms and condi-
tions attached to the acceptance of an offer is not 
necessary in order to make such terms and condi-
tions a part of the contract. Any conduct on the part 
of the original offerer showing his assen't to the 
modification of any terms and conditions of the 
contract is sufficient to make such modification a 
part of the contract. 135 ALR 822. 
The defendant signed the contract and returned 
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it to the plaintiff without comment as to the terms 
imposed by the letter. However, he thereafter pro-
ceeded to deliver the products in line with the terms 
imposed by the letter, namely: without objection, 
no material was purchased or delivered in the month 
of September; in the month of October, 11,995 gal-
lons were purchased, and this was delivered without 
objection, and in 'the month of November, prior to the 
notification of cancellation, the defendant delivered 
6,546 gallons. During this period, while the defen-
dant objected to the plaintiff's price practices, it 
made no objection to its failure to purchase what it 
now claims the minin1um of 20,000 a month. The 
first and only objection was by the letter of Novem-
bel' 19. 
In the case of American Lumber & Mfg. Co. 
vs. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Co. ( 290 Fed. 632, 3rd. 
Cir. Supra) 'the defendant ordered on one of its 
forms 40 cars of yellow pine lumber, setting forth 
its specifications, terms of payn1ent, ship1nent to 
be made within a given time and to be consigned to 
the defendant in the care of rail carrier at Cape· 
Charles, Virginia. Plaintiff accepted in writing, 
stating that payment was to be "Cash less 21~, 
named the price f.o.b. and concluded with a state-
ment that defendant's order is accepted according 
to the conditions as outlined. Lu1nber was shipped 
in part. Defendant then refused further ship1nent, 
stating there was no contract because the plaintiff 
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had failed to accept its counter offer. The court 
held that, by its actions, the defendant had accepted 
the counter offer by the ordering and acceptance 
of the lumber. The court said: 
"If the defendants written compliance 
were all there was in the case to indicate the 
meeting of the minds, there would be sub-
stance in the defendant's contention, for it is 
elementary law that to make a valid con tract, 
the meeting of the minds of the parties must 
meet on the same terms in the same sense. 
But the meeting of the minds of contracting 
parties 1nay occur - and be shown - not by 
words alone, but by conduct. Such conduct 
may be that of either party, or, indeed, both 
parties. In this case, however, the conduct was 
that of the defendant, raising the questions 
(or as we regard it) whether the contracts 
sued upon were in existence, not because of 
the plaintiff's conditional compliance with the 
defendant's offer, but because of the defen-
dant's assent to the conditions imposed by the 
plaintiff in acceptance of the defendant's of-
fers. Where one makes an offer and assents 
to an acceptance which is not responsive to 
the proposal, a con tract is made and he is, 
of course, bound by it. The offerer's assent 
to new terms in1posed by the offeree in his 
acceptance may be inferred from the fact 
that the parties therefrom proceeded 'to con-
duct business under the conditional accept~ 
ance. 
See the following cases: Everett vs. Emmons 
Coal Mining Co. ( 289 Fed. 686-6th Cir.), Bost.'Jn 
Lumber Co. vs. Pendleton Bros. 129 A. 782, Comm. 
Vaughom Sand Stone Inc. vs. Mon~is April & Bros. 
7 A. 2nd 868. 
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POINT II. 
ASSUMING THAT THE DEFENDAN'T'S INTER-
PRETATION OF THE CONTRACT IS CORRECT, 
PLAINTIFF, NEVERTHELESS, WAS NOT IN DE-
FAULT AS THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED TH~ 
PROVISIONS AS TO MINIMUM 1\iONTH'LY REQUIRE-
MEN·TS. 
Assuming that defendant's interpretation of 
the contract was correct, that no new conditions was 
imposed by plaintiffs' letter, the plaintiff was not 
in default for the defendant, by i'ts failure to object 
to the plaintiff's failure to purchase any products 
during the month of September and its delivery to 
the plaintiff of 11,995 gallons in October, waived 
the breach, if any, for such months, and in 'the 
month of November, plaintiff substantially perform-
ed the contract as to such minimum requirements 
by purchasing 19,599 gallons. The first and only 
objection for failure to purchase was by the letter 
of termination of the contract on November 19, to 
which termination the plaintiff took exception. 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in an ana-
logous situation, in the case of Yours Truly Biscuit 
Co. vs. ·Chas. H. Lilly Co. (253 Pac. 817) held a 
waiver where the plaintiff corporation, although 
placing its order wi'th the defendant corporation on 
January 28, 1924, for 2000 barrels of flour at a 
specified price to be delivered as wanted by April 
1, 19'24, only took 240 barrels by April 1, and after 
the expiration of the time provided in the contract 
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the plaintiff continued to order and the defendant 
delivered additional flour up until August 25, 1924, 
at which time 654 barrels had been delivered. The 
plaintiff ordered again on September 8 and was 
advised the contract had been canceled for failure 
to accept deli very of flour according to 'the terms of 
the contract. 'The plaintiff as here refused to rec-
ognize the cancellation. In this case, the court said : 
"Since the third ground is decisive of the 
rights of the parties, and we are disposed to 
hold that the assignment is well taken, we 
shall c~iscuss only that question. There is no 
dispute in the record that all deliveries of 
flour after April 1, were made under the 
contract, for each invoice bears upon i'ts face a 
statement so shov1ing. Now, where a contract 
has a provision fixing a time for performance, 
and the party who has the right to enforce 
the provision fails to do so, but continues the 
contract past the date of expiration by ac-
cepting and filling orders thereunder, can 
such party at any time he so elects cancel in-
stanter the contract? The authorities answer 
this question in the negative, and the basis 
of 'the holdings seems to be that, where one 
by his conduct has caused the other to believe 
that he has waived a provision which was 
placed there for his benefit, and considers the 
contract in full force and effect, common hon-
esty between men requires that, if he sub-
sequently desires to enforce 'the provision, 
reasonable time must be given the other party 
to comply with the terms of the contract. The 
rule is tersely stated in 24 R. C. L. p. 284, as 
follows: 
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"Through the right of one party to 
terminate the contract for the default of 
the other party is recognized, still he has 
the right to treat the contract as continu-
ing, the right to terminate being given for 
his benefit; and it seems to be generally 
recognized that, if he ·wishes to exercise this 
right, he must give reasonable notice of his 
election to do so to the party in default, 
else he will be deemed to have waived his 
right of termination on account of such 
past 'breaches." 
The defendant not only delivered the material, 
without objection, as aforementioned, but on several 
occasions in addition thereto advised the plaintiff 
that the requirements, both as to minimun1 and maxi-
mum gallonage were of no significance and tha't it 
could disregard them. (Dep. 10-11). VVhat more 
need there be to constitute a waiver? 
The purchase by the defendant in November 
of 19,599 gallons was a substantial performance of 
the contract and, where there is a substantial p~t:­
formance, i't gives no right of cancellation. (12 
Am. J ur., Sec. 343, Page 900). 
In any event, the defendant did not give the 
plaintiff notice that it expected it thereafter to com-
ply with the minimum gallonage requirements, if 
any existed, but on the contrary, served him with 
notice of cancellation of the contract. Irrespective 
of whether during the month of November, the 
plaintiff purchased 20,000 or 40,000 gallons fron1 
10 
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the defendant, it said it would not thereafter de-
liver to the plaintiff any additional products. 
Plaintiff contends that, at the very least, de-
fendant's acceptance of defective installments dur-
ing the months of September and October woud jus-
tify to a reasonable person that performance of that 
character was sa tifsactory. (See Washington case, 
Yours Truly Biscuit Co. vs. Chas. H. Lilly Co. 
Supra). Also see Re-statement of Contract, Sec. 300, 
which is quoted at page 18 of Petitioner's Brief. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Commerce 
Casualty Company vs. Campbell ( 188 S. E. 363) 
held that a provision against waiver may itself be 
\vaived. It said: 
"A provision against waiver may itself 
be waived." 
It should be kept in mind that the defendant 
did not notify the plaintiff at any 'time that it ex-
pected it to comply with the provisions of the con-
tract as to minimum requirements. It merely gave 
ndtice of cancellation. 
The plaintiff was not in default, when notified 
of cancellation of the contract by defendant. This 
was on "anticipatory breach", which gave the plain-
tiff an immediate right of action and excused it of 
performance on its part. 12 Am. J ur. p. 970, Sec. 
392, 17 C.J.S. p. 973, Sec. 472. 
This court in Jordan vs. Madsen et al, 252 Pac. 
570, 69 Utah 112, said: 
11 
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"It, of course, is well settled that a re-
nunciation or repudiation of a contract by 
one party before the time fixed for perform-
ance constitutes a breach and gives an im-
mediate right of action to the adverse party. 
5 Page on Contracts,§ 2885; 13 C.J. 651 * * *. 
The breach here as alleged operated as a dis-
charge of the contract, which gave the plain-
tiff, who was not in default, the right to ig-= 
nore the contract as a basis of his rights and 
to sue as he did in quasi contract to recover 
reasonable compensation for what he fur-
nished in partial performance of the contract 
( 5 Page on Contract § 3023) - here the value 
of his old car, alleged to be $900. The renun-
ciation discharged the plaintiff fron1 further 
performance. 5 Page, § 2883; 13 C.J. 653. 
POINT III. 
IN ANY EVENT, THERE VvAS A l\tiODIFICATION 
OF THE TERlVIS OF THE CONTRACT AS TO MINI-
MUM AND MAXIMUM REQUIRElVfENTS. 
The contract provided that the n1inimum and 
maximum requirements, if any, could be changed 
by mutual agreement. It said: 
"The quantity shall be all of the buyer's 
requirements up to a maximum quantity of 
40,000 gallons per month and a 1ninimun1 
quantity of 20,000 gallons per 1nonth, quan-
tity subject to change by n1utual agreement. 
We have no quarrel with the authorities cited 
by the petitioner to the effect that parole evidence 
is not admissable to vary the terms of a written 
agreement, however, it fails to recognize that the 
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provisions of a con'tract may be modified and that 
the modification can be shown by parole evidence. 
12 Am. J ur. Sec. 428 p. 1006. 
Should this court determine that the contract 
was subject to 'the minimum requirement and not 
modified by the letter of acceptance, plaintiff, never-
theless, urges that it was subsequently modified by 
the defendant's agreeing that the gallonage figures 
were of no significance and tha't it would always 
supply him with quantities needed. (Dep. 10-11). 
POINT IV. 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY 
NOT BE GRANTED WHERE A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACTS EXISTS AND DOUBT MUST BE RESOLVED 
AGAINST THE MOVING PARTY. 
See the following: Moore's Fed. Practice, 2nd 
Ed. Vol 6, Sec. 56. 04, pages 2028-2034, and Sec. 
556.15, pages 2101-2121, 212'3-2133. Traylor vs. 
Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 189 F. 2d 213, Chappel vs. 
Goltsman, 186 F 2d 215, Arnstein vs. Porter, 154 
F. 2d 464, Whittlin vs. Giacalone, 154 F. 2d 20; 
Parmelee vs. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F. 2d, 
582; 158 A.L.R. 1130; Hawkins vs. Frick-Reid Sup-
ply Corp., 154 F. 2nd 88; Toelelman vs. Missouri-
Kansas Pipe Line c.~., 130 F. 2d, 1016. 
SUMMARY 
1. Plaintiff's letter of transmittal constituted 
a counter offer as it imposed new conditions which 
were assented to by the defendant, namely, the 
13 
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monthly minimum requirement was eliminated from 
the defendant's offer, and this interpretation of the 
contract was placed upon it by 'the defendant by its 
acts, at least it raised a question of fact which can 
not be resolved on motion for summary judgment. 
2. In any event, if the minimum purchase 
requirements were not eliminated from the contract, 
the defendant, by its actions, waives such provision 
or, at least it raises a question of fact that can not 
be resolved on motion for summary judgment. 
3. In any event, the plaintiff and the defen-
dant agreed that the minimum and maximum re-
quirements were to be eliminated from the contract 
subsequent to its execution and this may be shown 
by parole evidence. 
4. That if there is any question as to whether 
or not plaintiff's letter of transmittal constituted 
a counter offer, the contract is then ambiguous and 
parole evidence is admissible to show the real intent 
of the parties. 
In line with the foregoing, it is respectfully 
submitted that the court did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion for sum1nary judgment and its 
order should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Attorney for Respondent 
822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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